Utomi, Buhari, Babangida, Jonathan: An “Aggression” Hypothesis
Posted April 11, 2011 · Charles O
Both Utomi and Buhari have contested the Nigerian Presidency since the return to civil rule in 1999. Both men have alleged massive rigging of each election they have contested — an allegation that is corroborated by the general agreement among everyone, including the principal beneficiary of 2007 presidential election — the “winner” of said election. Both men (Utomi and Buhari) have, as election contenders are wont to do in Nigeria, litigated the matter — often all the way to the Supreme Court, to no avail. And, run every four years both men have.
In terms of “pedigree” (a term whose political usage I detest, but which I will nonetheless use here since it has a specific colloquial meaning in Nigerian political discourse), both men have impressive resumes. Utomi rose to the upper echelon of corporate Nigeria (AGM, corporate affairs, Volkswagen of Nigeria) and of the Federal Government (special assistant to President Shagari) in his heyday—so he has highly relevant private and public sector experience. He is also a consummate scholar and academician; he has published several economics texts and co-founded a world-class business school in Lagos. By and large he is seen as a “good” man—one that Nigeria would be fortunate to have at the helm of its affairs.
Buhari was a career soldier who fought in the civil war, served as a military commander, and because Nigeria happens to have been run almost exclusively by the military from independence in 1960 through 1999, has also served in what would otherwise be civil administrative capacities: federal minister, state administrator, military head of state, and head of a government agency under Abacha’s dictatorship. Buhari is the only former head of state who is said to have not stolen a kobo of public money; however, his presidential aspiration has been bedeviled by questions as to whether: (a) a person who executed a coup should be elected President, (b) a person who prosecuted a controversial, authoritarian, and heavy-handed “War Against Indiscipline” should be elected President, and (c) a person who appears to be a religious fanatic in a pluralist and secular country should be President. Buhari appears to have answered these question, to wit: (a) that the coup was necessary to salvage Nigeria from the escalating corruption of the Shagari administration—and besides, it was a bloodless coup, (b) that WAI is really what Nigerians need—and, besides, Idiagbon was its instigator and main prosecutor, and (c) that the charge of religious fanatism is ridiculous—look, his VP running mate is a Christian pastor!
Anyway, the question before us is why, in spite of the fact that both Utomi and Buhari have contested the Presidency since 1999, Buhari is a serious contender in the 2011 race and Utomi is not. Why does it appear that Utomi has even altogether dropped out of the race? Why has Utomi not been able to translate his deep understanding of economic policy (he holds a PhD in political economy) into a compelling case for the Presidency in such a way that would make him a major contender?
I have a few suggestions, but the one I will propose in this write-up is that Utomi is not aggressive enough. By “not aggressive enough”, I don’t necessarily mean that he is not fighting hard enough to win the Presidency; what I am saying is that he is not perceived as a single-minded, will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-win kind of guy. This is one reason why Babangida might be perceived as more likely to win the presidency than Utomi. Babangida has “stature” (which is another word for “aggressive” as I propose it here). Loathsome as he is, Babangida strikes you as a person who is able to prevail on key people to move towards a desired end. And that is why whenever Babangida expresses an interest in a run for the presidency, folks starts to quiver. People feel a sense that incapable as he might be of winning a free and fair national election in Nigeria, he is likely than not able to bring his stature to bear directly on the substantive matter of interest, or indirectly by way of co-opting the machinery of the political establishment to achieve a desired objective. I am almost convinced that Babangida senses this on some subconscious level and, having little interest in the presidency in reality, merely feigns a bid every four years in order to toy with folks’ collective emotions. And so it is that Nigerians never cease to wax indignant at Babangida quadrennial pastime; some of us have even sworn to take up arms in revolt if Babangida were to so much as set a foot near the presidency. But, I digress. The point is that Babangida, like Buhari, appears to possess this nebulous attribute, stature—a perception that makes them appear at once able to put up a sustained fight and to push through an agenda in spite of opposition.
Contrast Goodluck Ebele Jonathan—a man whose rise to the presidency would be too dramatic to be believable were it not for the fact that it occurred before our very eyes. Here is a man who was only a state-level PDP functionary when he was picked to be a gubernatorial running mate. The word on the street is that Jonathan was so very afraid of taking over the governorship when his principal was forced out of office as a result of an intriguing political scandal that involved looting obscene amounts of state funds, jumping bail disguised as a woman, and fleeing the UK.
And what was the source of Jonathan’s consternation? He apparently was afraid that the deposed governor’s thugs (read: state political functionaries) might do him in. Jonathan did not—and still does not—have the chutzpah required to be a successful politician in Nigeria. We all know how the story continues: Obasanjo plucked him from the state governorship to be running mate to another godson pulled from the governorship of Katsina state, in the 2007 bid for the Nigerian Presidency. Hence, again, Jonathan did not have the opportunity to demonstrate or practice political jostling—what I have been calling “aggressiveness”—and to build his political stamina.
And so, eventually, Yar’Adua dies, Jonathan becomes President – again, not through any fight of his own (indeed, he had subjugated himself to then-First lady Turai Yar’Adua), but as a result of pressures applied by civil society and other political actors. Jonathan became President not by dint of his own effort, but by the fortune of being at the right place and the right time, and (in a way that would appear to contradict my thesis), being docile. True enough, his docility got him to the Presidency, riding on the coattails of others (Alamieyeseigha, Yar’Adua), prodded on by godfathers (Obasanjo), kneeling at the feet of pastors (Adeboye), and groveling at the feet of others (Babangida), but it will not help him retain the presidency. Why? I do not believe Jonathan has the aggressiveness that achieving and maintaining high political office in Nigeria requires.
People that have the level of political aggressiveness of the variant I have proposed here clearly appear to want what they are going after. Buhari appears to want the presidency. Utomi appears to be testing some hypothesis. Babangida is the exception that proves the rule. Jonathan does not appear to know what he wants.
On Saturday, April 16, 2011, we will know for sure whose desire and aggressiveness translates into a win of the Nigerian presidency. The important thing, for now, is for all eligible Nigerian voters to vote—and to then protect their votes.
CEO
April 11, 2011
Email to Friend | View Blog Archive
Comments
There are no comments on this entry yet.